

The Catholic Educational Review

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PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATIONAL REFORM*

Not many years ago the charge was commonly made that pedagogy was all theory and no practice. Then indeed it was as futile for the theorist to seek a hearing as it was hard to obtain one, for his views were condemned beforehand on the grounds of impracticability. Recently a change has come about. The critics have inverted the old proposition; and the charge now is, although perhaps not expressed in as many words, that education is all practice and no theory. Sweeping charges of whole movements, like the educational, need, of course, to be carefully weighed; they are seldom, if ever, literally true. As it was erroneous to charge education a few years ago as all theory, it is untrue to assert that it is today all practice. But there is an element of truth in both charges, especially the latter.

Reforms are, as a rule, the most conspicuous movements in any field. They are first to attract attention and draw the fire of criticism. Educational reforms are no exception to the rule, and the sweeping charges just mentioned when applied to them as representing the leading educational issues do present a certain cogency and aptness. Many of the old-time reforms were, indeed, plausible in theory, but a great distance off from actual practice; many of the present-day reforms would hit straight at practice; the theory, however, on which they are based is often very elusive and is what needs examination. So in a matter of reform today we inquire not merely what the reformer proposes to do and how he is to do it, what is his practice, but we look also for his motives, and his principles, or his theory. In this

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consideration, therefore, of educational reform, we shall be chiefly concerned about the fundamental questions, those that refer more to principle than to practice or plan.

The need of educational reform is as constant as that of social reform. New demands are ever being made upon the school, and an adequate fulfilment of its mission can only come from a constant readjustment to meet the existing needs. Every great vital change reacts upon the school. If the social order be disturbed by a new kind of home, then the school must supply the child with the training which the home has relinquished. If industry creates new skills, then the school must prepare the future workers to acquire them. If democracy conceives a new ideal of civic service, then the school is to prepare youth for it. And while society and industry and politics react upon it in various ways, education itself creates new situations calling for readjustments of its forces.

The need, then, of readjustment is obvious, but the readjustment which is called reform must, nevertheless, be given the closest scrutiny. It may be a real reshaping or readjusting, or reforming, and it may be only a shifting or a surface movement. It may be a thorough, radical, far-reaching change; it may only be a temporary adaptation or expedient. Educational history and events of our own day furnish abundant examples.

Before attempting to evaluate a proposed reform in the light of its principles, which means, of course, to submit it to the legitimate criteria of reform, it is well to examine first its source or its inspiration. Despite our recognition of the need of any given reform, the inspiration or source whence it springs is important. We need only recall the reasons given in support of some recently proposed reforms to see how appealing may be the motive claimed for them. In a progressive age, and with an ambitious people, the inspiring motive may be, for example, efficiency, a conservation and organization of forces which will better promote scientific, cultural, and even moral progress, for we are to be efficient always, an idea which, by the way, should appeal to Catholics strongly, and especially to religious, for we are not to be less economical than others, and if we diligently conserve

material forces and elements can we do less with spiritual and moral? Efficiency is a much used and abused term, but when it spells economy, conservation of energy, prevention of waste, progress, we want all we can get of it, by whatever name it may be called. But this, of course, is not the only inspiration of reform. The right of the rising generation to the best that can be provided for them makes a strong appeal to parents and lovers of mankind. The equalization of opportunity strikes deeply as an appeal to the American, who knows no caste or barrier to the progress of the worthy and capable. Patriotism finally, or the needs of the State in formation of its citizenship, offers inspiration to reform. While by each of these and undoubtedly many others reform may be inspired, we must realize, too, that each and all can be the alleged as well as the true source and motive of reform. And the lack of enthusiasm which greets the professional reformer, the almost universal distrust of reformers, offers evidence of this.

After the inspiration has been noted the real criteria may be applied. While we do not pretend to treat all the legitimate criteria, for the mere enumeration would take considerable time, some of the more salient may be mentioned. First among them should be one with reference to the nature of the reform itself. Is the reform really educational, or is it first of all some other kind of reform, for instance, a political, or a partisan reform, with an educational aspect? It is well to know this for a proper evaluation of the reform and its educational program, for although the latter may be excellent, if it be secondary in importance to something else it may be only the means to an end, and should be accordingly evaluated.

Secondly, while being a forward movement, does it preserve what is good in the present order? Is it conservative in the right sense? A reform should never assume that everything in the existing order is wrong, for reformation would then be impossible and revolution necessary. Reformation is like correction: it builds up primarily and breaks down only what it is impossible to improve. Thirdly, it should be asked, Is the reform thorough? Does it go to the bottom of things, or is it merely engaged with the superficial, the transitory?

Fourthly, does it promise definite results? In behalf of the serious reformer it should, of course, be said that real reform does not work over night, and the final results in the matter of education can only be measured by lifetime accomplishments. But every reform must have definite objectives and be judged in accordance with the degree of their realization. None can forget the dismay of Pestalozzi when the government inspectors, headed by Père Girard, his friend, condemned his school at Iverdun because found wanting in practical results, as judged by the standards of the investigators, although very definite results were apparent to Pestalozzi himself, results that his methods had aimed to produce. Concrete objectives must be held out by any reform before it may hope to upset the given order. We are not to sacrifice what we have for an uncertainty, neither are we to permit educational systems to be experimented with, or subjected to chance operation. The experiment is to be proved first in its own legitimate field, before seeking general adoption.

Finally, among the criteria, it may be inquired whether the reform has ever before been attempted and with what results.

Conspicuous examples are afforded by the History of Education of movements and theories revived in one century or generation that had been tried out in an earlier, and discarded because of failure of one kind or another. It would, perhaps, have been a time saver, if a few years ago, when a hue and cry was raised in behalf of instruction in sex hygiene, to have referred to the historical fact that the subject was taught by the naturalists of the eighteenth century, and, according to their own testimony, with unsatisfactory results.

The reform should then successfully meet at the outset these criteria; it should be rightly motivated and inspired; it should be truly educational, although it might not be wholly educational; it should be constructive and conservative; it should be thorough; it should be practical and definite as to results; it should stand the test of history, or, at least, have no failures as historical precedents. But, over and above these criteria, and whatever other may be raised, the reform

must be based on sound principles. Here, naturally, is the parting of the ways for the reformers as it is for the educators. The same principle is not equally sound for the naturalist, materialist, and Christian, and, in accordance with its standard adopted for evaluation, principles stand or fall. So a reform movement based on purely biological principles, with no view beyond the physical functioning of the organism, can not satisfy in aim and objective the criteria of reform from a Christian and Catholic viewpoint.

We have our own distinct aims in education, and these must be evident in reform as in any other activity. A reform proposed for us will need to meet greater criteria. These are not merely the educational in a technical sense, but such as are demanded by the great religious and vital principles in the light of which the Church discharges her educational mission.

Educational reform from the Catholic viewpoint should aim to bring the teachings and laws of the Church more completely into the life of the people. It should prepare Catholics for a better appreciation, as well as performance, of their religious duties. It should make them more capable exponents and defenders of Catholic truth. It should make them better citizens. It should provide wider opportunities for them in scientific and professional fields.

In view of this aim no part or section of the educational field which Catholics have entered is exempt from reform. Whether it be the system as a whole, which should be as well coordinated as the Church itself, organized in university, college, high school and elementary grades, with diocesan systems of parish schools enjoying autonomy, yet profiting by that strength which comes from general organization and unity in whatever department or division it appears, the reform movement should be actuated by our own superior aims and not by the lesser ones of many of our contemporaries. If we have been called upon from sheer necessity to have our own educational systems, then their improvement and reform may well be regulated by our own standards. We shall not merely attempt to meet the ordinary educational criteria of reform; we are forced to do much more.

We have said a word of the field of reform, no part of

which can be declared exempt, but we can scarcely say much more than a word for the breadth and extent of the subject which unfolds itself before us. To speak adequately of the curriculum alone in connection with reform would take more time than we can use, but once referred to, may we not express the hope that when the reform operates there it will bring as good a course of study as educational science has so far devised, and as Catholic in aim and purpose as it can be made, and this not merely in regard to the elementary, but the high-school and college courses as well? Excellent work is under way in vitalizing and reconstructing curricula, but it is, from our viewpoint, unbalanced work, and the best results, almost the only results, so far achieved, have been realized in the mental and physical side. There has not been that attention to the moral side which Catholic education must give if the curriculum is to aid in achieving the purpose which actuates the Church in her general educational pursuits.

In a similar vein we may refer to the text-books as auxiliaries of our course of study. Many efforts are now being made to improve them, and such auxiliaries to the courses of study as they are may not be overlooked in our reforming processes. When dealing with them, our general aims need to be before us fully as much as when we are engaged with reforming the curriculum. Then again there is in regard to the text-books a commercial interest at stake which is absent in the case of the curriculum, an interest which may be used to good advantage, for the progressive publisher seeks to market the book which will best serve the interests of its particular field. None will doubt that there still is great room for reform in this portion of the field; that there is ample opportunity to discard some books in use which are in no educational way Catholic text-books, and opportunity for a new presentation of subject matter, conjointly with the curriculum from the Catholic viewpoint. Although there still may be Catholic teachers who cannot see why we should have a Catholic arithmetic or our own Latin grammar, we maintain we should have our own books in the interest of the principles of association and correlation, and in view of our own self-respect. For so large a body, given so much to edu-

cation and claiming specific purposes, Catholic text-books would seem to be as great a need as a Catholic curriculum, and for those who have been so long identified with the teaching of the classics not to have text-books and manuals is to raise a question as to our scholarship in these particular fields.

The domain of methods, however, must appeal to all who are familiar with our conditions as most vitally in need of attention. Some reforming is taking place here and is bound to react upon both curriculum and text-books. New methods are appearing, and they should be encouraged to appear. With their greater number, however, much as we welcome them, will come no guaranty of better teaching, for the latter requires more than a multiplicity of methods; it requires good teachers. All methods depend for their success upon the ability of the teachers to use them. Associated, therefore, with the topic of methods is teacher training, and here we may well pause in our discussion of reform and ask ourselves if it is not on this point alone that the efficiency and validity of all our reforming depends. We may be of one mind as to principle, or purpose, or plan; we may bring together the finest administrative system; construct the most adequate curriculum and text-books; devise the most efficient methods, but without teacher preparation, when and where is the reform to begin?

This is, indeed, the fundamental need. All else depends upon it, and the wave of certification that is sweeping over the country, revealing unheard-of conditions, and affecting all the States to the extent of legislating what teacher-training must be, has already shown its effect in Catholic circles. What the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore made a matter of law for all the dioceses of the country in 1886, namely, that every teacher in the Catholic parish schools be certified by a diocesan board of examiners and be required to hold a teacher's diploma, is coming nearer to realization now than ever before. How much the State legislation is assisting remains for the interested to observe. So, too, the normal school, made even then a matter of urgent necessity by the same council, is in a fairer way to general adoption. The Department of Education, recently appointed by the Hier-

archy, now has before it a tentative plan for a Catholic normal course. Within a short time, presumably, there will appear, with the sanction of the Bishops, an official program for our normal work. It will not be, nor can it be, inferior to the normal training of the country; neither will it be the ideal or the maximum which any teacher should receive. It should be a good minimum, and be made to bind on every religious community whose subjects teach in our elementary schools. Its graduates should be certified by legitimate Catholic authority, as the Baltimore Council required, i.e., by a Board of Examiners. With such a plan in operation, can there be any dread of State certification? And, while we may debate the principle as to whether the State has the right to regulate in this matter of the certification of the teachers of private schools, it is well to know that the Apostolic Delegate to the United States, in his letter of 1892, addressed to the Archbishops assembled in New York for settling the school question, recommended that Catholic teachers obtain certificates or diplomas, both from the diocesan boards of examiners and also from the States.

Teacher training should not, of course, stop with the preparation of the teacher for the elementary schools. It should and must eventually reach upward to those who teach in high school, college, and university. Professional training is as urgent there as in the grades, and this view, although slowly gaining favor, promises to hold securely in the future.

Methods have finally invaded high school and college teaching; some good works have already appeared in connection with them, and, while all that is asked of many high-school teachers is an academic degree, fitness to teach, as witnessed by professional training or experience, is coming into demand. Consequently, while we endeavor to prepare for higher teaching with strong content courses, the educational or professional should accompany the rest, for the high-school or college staff is not composed merely of Latinists, or chemists, or historians, but of teachers, men and women, who not only know their sciences and arts, but who have been trained to teach them.

Our teacher training should then be comprehensive, embracing the candidates for the primary school up to the

university staff, and every prospective teacher should be required to submit to it. The plan is at hand for the elementary; reform is in order for the higher grades. Let the standard which determines the requirements of teachers for high school and college include professional training and not academic preparation alone. Let the prospective college teacher meet a professional requirement in education, whether he pursue courses for the master's or the doctor's degree. The reform in methods, text-books, curriculum, or in administrative departments, can then be said to have been inaugurated, for without adequately trained teachers it can never be successfully launched.

The teacher is the crux of the situation. As our hope for the future rests with him, so does our salvation for the present. No reform can obtain a hearing without his sympathy, and none given a fair test without his cooperation. We are therefore interested, not only in the future teachers, those about to undergo preparation, but we are concerned about those already in the service. For the improvement of the latter much is being done through summer and extension courses, so that while still teaching they may study and measure up to legitimate requirements. It appears only too often, however, that the aim of some of these courses is merely to meet a State requirement or to enable the student to accumulate enough credit to obtain a diploma or a degree. There has not been that stress which should be exerted on professional or educational courses, or that adherence to standards which should govern teacher-training. The certifying bodies are, very fortunately, withholding their certificates even from those who possess degrees when the studies pursued to obtain the degree are found wanting in academic or professional requirements. They are looking back of the degree and issuing their certificates on the basis of the studies pursued or work done. For our teachers in the service, then, while making every sacrifice to enable them to obtain the means of improvement and possess all legitimate requirements, we should not demand less than the equivalent of a good normal course for the elementary teachers, a college course for high-school teachers, and university training for the college staff. Any other practice can hardly be supported

by sound theory or principle, and if we are to reform, our principles must be right.

To repeat, then, adequate teacher-preparation is indeed the starting point of reform, and once it is attained so that our teachers are abreast of every real educational advance, our situation will be secure. Reform in education is always in order, for there will always be room for improvement. In regard to many things, like teacher-training, it has already come, and no man dare forecast what the future will bring. There is a national interest in education today that did not exist five years ago, and while emergency and contingency may at any time arise and bring forth its usual quota of half-measures to solve current problems, we may safely and securely proceed in our attempts to cope with present difficulties if, while adhering true to principle and motive, we test each proposed reform in the light of sound educational criteria and those aims in reform which have ever guided the Church in her venerable educational career.

PATRICK J. MCCORMICK.

SUMMER SESSION OF CATHOLIC SISTERS COLLEGE

REPORT OF SECRETARY

The eleventh summer session of the Catholic Sisters College was opened on July 5 and closed on August 12. The enrollment was the largest in the record of attendance at the Washington sessions. There were 391 Sisters and 22 lay women, a total of 413 students.

The Religious, representing thirty Orders and congregations, came from ninety-one distinct motherhouses in the United States and Canada. Thirty-one States were represented in the registration and fifty-two dioceses of this country and Canada.

The following charts show the registration in detail for States, dioceses, and religious communities:

CHART I

General Summary

Sister students	391
Lay students	22
Total	413
Religious Orders and Congregations	30
Motherhouses	91
Dioceses	52
States	31

CHART II

Students According to States (Including Lay Students)

Alabama	11	Maryland	3
Arkansas	4	Massachusetts	19
California	2	Michigan	14
Connecticut	16	Minnesota	6
District of Columbia	24	Missouri	1
Florida	9	New Hampshire	3
Georgia	6	New Jersey	16
Illinois	10	New York	25
Iowa	1	North Carolina	2
Kentucky	9	North Dakota	3
Louisiana	4	Ohio	33

Oklahoma	2	West Virginia	7
Pennsylvania	123	Wisconsin	21
South Carolina	4	CANADA	
Texas	8	Hyacinth, Quebec	2
Tennessee	6	St. John's, Newfoundland	4
Virginia	7	Ottawa	3

CHART III

Students According to Dioceses

Alexandria	3	Louisville	5
Alton	7	Manchester	3
Altoona	2	Milwaukee	6
Baltimore	24	Mobile	11
Boston	6	Nashville	6
Buffalo	11	New York	9
Charleston	4	Newark	25
Chicago	3	Ogdensburg	3
Cincinnati	8	Oklahoma	2
Cleveland	23	Philadelphia	50
Covington	4	Pittsburgh	17
Crookston	2	Richmond	3
Dallas	6	Rochester	2
Davenport	1	San Antonio	3
Detroit	10	St. Augustine	9
Duluth	2	San Francisco	2
Erle	13	St. Paul	2
Fall River	10	Savannah	4
Fargo	3	Scranton	13
Galveston	1	Toledo	2
Grand Rapids	4	Vicariate of North Carolina..	2
Green Bay	5	Wheeling	7
Harrisburg	10	CANADA	
Hartford	16	St. John's, Newfoundland	4
Indianapolis	4	St. Hyacinth	2
La Crosse	10	Ottawa	3
Little Rock	4		

CHART IV

Students According to Communities

Benedictines	33	Ridgely, Md.	2
Bristow, Va.	3	Shoal Creek, Ark.	1
Cullman, Ala.	4	St. Mary's, Pa.	2
Crookston, Minn.	2	Blessed Sacrament	10
Duluth, Minn.	2	Cornwell Heights, Pa. ..	10
Elizabeth, N. J.	13	Charity	7
Erle, Pa.	2	Mt. St. Joseph, Ohio ..	3
Ferdinand, Ind.	2	Nazareth, Ky.....	4

Dominicans	25	Hartford, Conn.	4
Caldwell, N. J.	1	Haverhill, Mass.	2
Mt. Clemens, Mich.	3	Rochester, N. Y.	2
Nashville, Tenn.	4	St. Augustine, Fla.	9
Newburgh, N. Y.	3	Stevens Point, Wis.	2
Sinsinawa, Wis.	10	St. Paul, Minn.	2
Springfield, Ill.	4	Wheeling, W. Va.	7
Franciscans	14	St. Mary	7
Clinton, Ia.	1	Fort Worth, Texas	4
Highland Falls, N. Y.	1	Lockport, N. Y.	3
Manitowoc, Wis.	3	Mercy	91
Peekskill, N. Y.	5	Belmont, N. C.	2
St. Bonaventure P. O., N. Y.	2	Buffalo, N. Y.	3
Sylvania, Ohio	2	Cincinnati, Ohio	2
School Sisters of St. Francis ..	3	Cresson, Pa.	2
Milwaukee, Wis.	3	Fall River, Mass.	2
Third Order of St. Francis ..	12	Gabriels, N. Y.	3
Glen Riddle, Pa.	12	Grand Rapids, Mich. ..	4
Felician Sisters of St. Francis 15		Harrisburg, Pa.	10
Buffalo, N. Y.	3	Hartford, Conn.	12
Detroit, Mich.	7	Little Rock, Ark.	3
Lodi, N. J.	2	Manchester, N. H.	3
Milwaukee, Wis.	3	Nashville, Tenn.	2
Grey Nuns of the Cross	3	Oklahoma, Okla.	2
Ottawa, Canada	3	Pittsburgh, Pa.	16
Holy Child Jesus	10	St. Johns, Newfoundl'd	2
Sharon Hill, Pa.	10	Titusville, Pa.	10
Holy Cross	22	Wilkes-Barre, Pa.	13
Notre Dame, Ind.	22	Our Lady of Mercy	4
Daughters of the Holy Cross ..	3	Charleston, S. C.	4
Shreveport, La.	3	Notre Dame	3
Holy Family of Nazareth	5	Cleveland, Ohio	3
Des Plaines, Ill.	3	Perpetual Adoration	7
Torresdale, Pa.	2	Birmingham, Ala.	7
Holy Union of Sacred Hearts ..	8	Precious Blood	3
Fall River, Mass.	8	Maria Stein, Ohio	3
Humility of Mary	4	Providence	2
Lowellville, Ohio	4	St. Mary of the Woods ..	2
Incarnate Word and Bles- sed Sacrament	2	Divine Providence	5
Victoria, Texas	2	Melbourne, Ky.	4
St. Joseph	59	San Antonio, Texas	1
Augusta, Ga.	4	Presentation	2
Brighton, Mass.	4	St. Johns, Newfoundl'd	2
Chestnut Hill, Pa.	22	St. Mary of the Presentation ..	3
Erie, Pa.	1	Oakwood, N. D.	3
		Presentation of the Bl. V. Mary	2
		San Francisco	2

Presentation of Mary	2	Dallas, Texas	2
St. Hyacinth, Quebec ..	2	Decatur, Ill.	3
Ursulines	24	Louisville, Ky.	1
Bryan, Texas	1	Pittsburgh, Pa.	1
Cleveland, Ohio	12	Youngstown, Ohio	4

Fifty-four lecture courses and five laboratory courses were offered. There were thirty-two instructors, of whom twenty-five were members of the Catholic University faculty. In addition to the courses set down in the Year Book, 1921-1922, there was a course in Educational Measurements by Mr. Foran, M. A.

There were the following special lectures: Gregorian Chant, five lectures by Dom Eudine; Dante, by Right Rev. Bishop T. J. Shahan; Catholic Missions in Bengal, India, by Rev. Fr. Mathis, C.S.C.; Industrial Democracy, by Rev. Dr. John A. Ryan; a lecture by Miss Regan of the National Catholic Welfare Council.

There were the following piano recitals: On July 8, by Miss Gertrude Henneman; on July 13, by Miss Minna Niemann; on July 18, by Mr. Alexander Henneman.

On the evening of July 20, at 7.30, a motion picture entertainment in the interest of the National Shrine of the Immaculate Conception was given by Reverend Bernard A. McKenna, S.T.D.

A solemn High Mass of Requiem was celebrated on Saturday, July 30, at 8.30 a. m., in the chapel of Gibbons Hall, for the repose of the soul of Very Rev. Thomas E. Shields. The celebrant was the Very Rev. Dr. McCormick, Dean of the Sisters College. The Rt. Rev. Thomas J. Shahan, Rector of the University, delivered the eulogy.

THOMAS J. MCGOURTY,
Acting Secretary.

LEGAL STATUS OF CATHOLIC SCHOOLS IN WESTERN CANADA

(Continued)

II.—CATHOLIC SCHOOLS AND PROVINCIAL LEGISLATION

It was only after British Columbia became organized as one of the Canadian provinces, in the year 1871, that anything like an educational system was established within its territory. Even at the time of confederation the total population of the province numbered but 36,247 souls, of which "only 8,500 were white men."³⁰ In the year 1872 the Legislative Assembly of the new province took the matter of education under consideration and passed the "Public School Act," making provision for the establishment, maintenance, and management of public schools in British Columbia. By section 1 of this Act, the Common School Ordinance of 1869 and the Common School Ordinance of 1870, i.e., the pre-confederation educational legislation, then on the statute books, though not operative, were repealed. Provision was made whereby schools established under this Act were to be financed "out of the General Revenue of the Province." . . . "the sum of forty thousand dollars for public school purposes"³¹ was to be set apart by the officer in charge of the treasury for the coming year, and each subsequent year a sum was to be voted for educational purposes by the Legislative Assembly. Section 3 of the Act gave to the Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council power to appoint "six fit and proper persons" to be a Board of Education for the Province of British Columbia "to hold office during the pleasure of the Lieutenant Governor." The Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council was also empowered "to appoint a Superintendent of Education who shall be *ex-officio* chairman of the Board of Education." By this Act all authority was centered in the Lieutenant-Governor, who had the appointment of the General Board of Education, and the Superintendent of Education, in whose hands practically all matters connected with the establishment, maintenance, and administration of schools

³⁰Porritt, E., *Evolution of the Dominion of Canada*, p. 54.

³¹*Public Schools Act of British Columbia*, 1872, section 2.

was placed; even the appointment and dismissal of teachers coming under their jurisdiction. The educational system provided for by the Public School Act of 1872 was to be "strictly non-sectarian." "All public schools established under the provisions of this Act shall be conducted upon strictly non-sectarian principles. The highest morality shall be inculcated, but no religious dogmas or creed shall be taught."³² No provision was made for separate or Catholic schools. Nor could any claim be made for the recognition of the Catholic school system by the provincial authorities as a part of the general educational system. For although section 93 was by the act of Union of 1871 made applicable in its provinces to British Columbia, it being provided that "the provisions of the British North American Act of 1867 shall be made applicable to British Columbia in the same way and to the like extent as they apply to the other provinces of the Dominion," and as if the colony of British Columbia had been one of the provinces originally united under the said Act,³³ still the Catholics of the province had no legal claim to recognition, for at no time previous to the Union had the Catholic schools been recognized by the legislature as a part of the educational system of the colony. Section 93 of the British North American Act, which guarantees to the religious minority all the privileges and rights that it had before the Union, would have guaranteed and safeguarded the right to separate schools had such schools been legally recognized previous to the Union, and section 35 of this Public School Act would have been *ultra vires*—null and void.

Only the legal recognition of Catholic Schools before Confederation would have established a legal claim to the continuance of such recognition under section 93 of the British North America Act, and the Catholic Schools of British Columbia, like those existing in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick previous to and at the time of Confederation, had never been established or sanctioned by any authority having legislative jurisdiction. Already the matter had been definitely decided by the decision of the highest court of

³²Op. cit., section 35.

³³British Columbia Act of Union, 1871, section 10.

appeal, the Privy Council, in the case of the New Brunswick Catholic School system. In New Brunswick, before Confederation, there was a parish school system such as existed in British Columbia at the Union. Four years after Confederation, when an educational bill was enacted by the provincial legislature ignoring the Catholic School system, the question was raised whether the parish school system constituted a separate school system under the terms of the British North America Act. A case was taken to the judicial committee of the Privy Council at Whitehall (London). The decision (which also decided the legal status of Catholic schools in Nova Scotia) was that the New Brunswick parish system could not properly be held to constitute a separate school system.³⁴

Four years after the establishment of the present system of "non-sectarian" schools in the province, Premier Elliott introduced into the legislature a measure which called forth a vigorous protest from the Catholics and others in favor of denominational schools. This was the School Tax Bill of 1876, an Act to provide for the maintenance of the public schools of the province. By this Act it was provided that every male person above the age of eighteen years, resident in the province, should pay an annual tax of three dollars for the support of the public schools. The Catholics protested against being compelled to pay such a tax for the support of public schools, inasmuch as for conscientious reasons they could not use these schools, and so were obliged to support schools of their own, and petitioned the legislature that Catholics be exempted from such additional burden, or that Catholic schools be recognized as part of the educational system of the province. "The legislature failed to recognize the validity of such objections urged, and that was the first and last effort in the establishing of separate schools in the province."³⁵

Several years later the title of the Bill was changed by being amended by the Revenue Tax Act, and so at present its connection with the support of public schools is not noticed.

The Public School Act of 1872, with its amendments, re-

³⁴Porritt, *op. cit.*, p. 242.

³⁵Gosnell, *R. E. British Columbia Year Book*, p. 61.

maintained in force for seven years, when the legislature revoked all previous education acts and in lieu thereof passed the Public School Act of 1879, by which certain provisions of the old Act were abolished, others modified, and new provisions added. This Act, with certain "Rules and Regulations" was issued shortly afterwards, and with certain amendments remains the school law of the present day.

The new Act did not in any way change or modify the provincial attitude with respect to Catholic Schools. Section 35 of the Public School Act of 1872, providing for "non-sectarian" schools, remained operative in the province until amended in 1905, when this section was supplanted by section 3, which remains in force to the present day. This section provides that "All public schools shall be free and shall be conducted on strictly secular and non-sectarian principles. The highest morality shall be inculcated, but no religious dogmas or creed shall be taught. The Lord's Prayer may be used in opening or closing schools." Section 3 of the present school law and section 35 of the Act of 1872 are almost identical, the only real change being the addition of the word "secular" and permission to use the Lord's Prayer at the opening or the closing of schools. This section as it stands excludes the possibility of the legal recognition of a separate or denominational school system in the province.

Catholic schools, although not recognized as a part of the provincial school system of British Columbia, have, however, some slight recognition given to their work under the Compulsory Education Clause. Attendance at a Catholic school is accepted as fulfilling the provisions of the Act without any attempt being made by the authorities to regulate in any way the courses given, the qualifications of teachers, or any other of its features. All Catholic children from seven to fourteen years, inclusive, or any child, for that matter, can fulfill the prescriptions of "section 140" of the British Columbia Educational Act by attending a Catholic school. This holds good, also, in all other parts of Canada, even where Catholic separate schools form a part of the provincial educational system. In Alberta and Saskatchewan, as well as in Ontario, many convent schools are conducted as private schools without attempt

being made to place restrictions thereon by the provincial authorities.

A different condition of affairs obtains in Australia, where Catholic schools, although not recognized as a part of the provincial system, are obliged to submit to certain provincial restrictions and regulations. This is also the case in some of the States of the American Union. In West Australia, for example, "Catholic and other non-government schools must be declared efficient by the education department" if attendance at them is to be recognized as fulfilling the requirements of the compulsory education law. "The school register must be open to inspection of the compulsory attendance officers of the Department of Education."

In the province of Victoria (Australia), section 60 of the Act of 1910 empowers the Minister of Education "to authorize the inspection of any school (other than a State school) in order to ascertain whether instruction given is satisfactory."³⁶

In Massachusetts, since 1882,³⁷ Catholic and other private schools must submit themselves to the approval of local authorities in order that attendance at them may be deemed a compliance with the Compulsory School Law."³⁸

In Nebraska, among other regulations affecting Catholic schools, parish schools and their teachers are governed by the provisions of the school law of the State in so far as these apply "to grades, qualification, and certification of teachers, and the promotion of pupils."³⁹ "Courses in the parish schools must be, for all the grades, substantially the same as those given in the public schools."⁴⁰ They are subject to the inspection of county or city superintendents as if they were public schools. All teachers in Catholic schools must have obtained a "teacher's certificate entitling them to teach corresponding courses or classes in public schools, where the children attending would attend in the absence of such private or parochial school."⁴¹

While no such regulations exist in British Columbia af-

³⁶Cf. Australian Year Book, 1916, p. 812.

³⁷Public Statutes, ch. 47.

³⁸Catholic Educational Association Bulletin, Vol. 16, Nov., 1919.

³⁹1918, Nebraska House Rule 64, Section 1.

⁴⁰Op. Cit. Section 2.

⁴¹Op. cit. Section 3.

fecting Catholic schools, yet it would seem that there is nothing in the Provincial or in the Federal constitution which would prevent such legislative action on the part of the provincial legislature. Such action could not be held under section 93 of the British North America Act to "prejudicially affect any right or privilege with respect to schools," which Catholics had by law within the province at the time of Union. Besides, the Supreme Court of Canada seems to have decided this question, for in the case of the Manitoba school decision Judge Patterson declared that in the judgment of the Supreme Court "there is no general prohibition which shall affect denominational schools. . . . There is, therefore, room for legislative regulation on many subjects, as for example, compulsory attendance of scholars, the sanitary condition of the school houses, and sundry other matters which may be dealt with without interfering with the denominational character of the school." While such a decision applies primarily to such provinces as Manitoba, Alberta, and Saskatchewan, where Catholic schools formed, or now form, a part of the regular provincial educational system; yet it would seem that in the absence of any other general legal exemption, the Catholic schools of British Columbia might be subject to provincial regulations to the extent indicated by the Supreme Court decision in the Manitoba case.

Has the legislature of British Columbia the power to abolish Catholic or denominational schools and compel attendance at its State or provincial non-sectarian schools? In Manitoba the provincial legislature has no such power, for the Privy Council has decided that "notwithstanding the Public School Act of 1907, Roman Catholics and members of every other religious body in Manitoba are free to establish schools throughout the Province. They are free to conduct schools according to their own religious tenets without molestation or interference, and no child is compelled to attend a public school." Whether the rights and privileges enumerated above, as applying to Manitoba, exist, and apply to the same extent with reference to the Catholics of British Columbia is a matter of uncertainty. In the opinion of the great constitutional authority, Clement, "such a law could not be passed in On-

tario, Quebec, or Manitoba, *sed quaere* as to the province."⁴² As this was written in 1903, before the establishment of the two provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan, the statement can hardly refer directly to these provinces. The writer undoubtedly had the British Columbia situation in mind, and, according to his opinion, the matter was doubtful. In any case it would be for the courts to determine the validity of such legislation, and should the Supreme Court or Privy Council decide that such action was *intra vires* of the legislature of British Columbia, then recourse could be had to an appeal under section 93 of the British North America Act to the Federal Legislature or the Governor-in-Council for remedial legislation to safeguard the just claims of the Catholic minority to maintain Catholic schools within the province.

It may be asked if there is anything in the Federal or Provincial Constitution to prevent the future recognition of the Catholic schools as a part of the provincial system. In answer, it may be stated that this rests entirely with the provincial legislature, which is quite competent at any time, if it so wills, to repeal Section 3 of the present Public Schools Act and to adopt a system similar to that existing in Alberta, Saskatchewan, or Quebec. Once the Catholic schools of British Columbia could secure legal recognition by the legislature of the province the continuance of such recognition would be guaranteed or safeguarded by section 93 of the Federal Constitution, which would, in relation to such schools, immediately become operative. Even at the present time there would seem to be no valid legal objection to prevent the authorities from giving the Catholic schools of British Columbia some formal recognition, at least to the extent that they are recognized in Nova Scotia or New Brunswick, where, although not provided for or permitted by the provincial school law, separate or Catholic schools are recognized by practice or custom and supported by provincial school funds on condition that the standard courses are conducted under teachers with provincial licenses.

Yet to all appearances the date for such recognition of Catholic schools in British Columbia is quite distant; for

⁴²Clement, Canadian Constitution, p. 322.

under the present provincial legislation no general exemption from taxes is made in favor of Catholic schools, which are constrained to bear their proportionate share of provincial and municipal taxation. It is true that the Academy of St. Ann, Victoria, has been exempted by an Act of the provincial legislature, a favor accorded them some years ago for services rendered the community by the Sisters of St. Ann during a plague, and not in view of the educational services rendered the province of British Columbia by their school.^{42a}

(To be continued)

^{42a}Cf. Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. 2, p. 791.

THE RADICALISM OF SHELLEY AND ITS SOURCES*

(Continued)

With Spinoza, Drummond maintains that two substances having different attributes can have nothing in common between them; and that there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature. Infinite, immaterial, eternal, substance has nothing in common with substance which is material, finite, and perishable. How is it possible, then, that the former produced the latter? "An immaterial substance is necessarily without extension, or solidity, and never could have bestowed what it never possessed. God is infinite and consequently his substance is the sole, universal and eternal substance. Of this eternal substance there are two modifications—mind and extension. Human mind is part of the infinite mind of God. By body is meant the mode which expresses the essence of God, inasmuch as it is contemplated as extended substance, in a certain limited way, consequently though we do not call the Deity corporeal, as that would express what is finite, yet we say that all extended substance is contained in God, since extension and mind are the eternal attributes of his essence."¹³⁸

Matter moves and acts according to its own laws; it preserves what we term the fair order of the universe, and it guides the motions of those worlds that are constituted out of it, by the properties which are inherent in it. "Why then should we not say that it feels, thinks and reasons in man. Thoughts and sentiments proceed from peculiar distributions of atoms in the human brain." The same necessity which gives us a peculiar form and constitution also gives us a peculiar disposition and character. From these observations we may conclude with certainty that all bodies are capable of being affected by attraction and repulsion, of making combinations, of suffering dissolution, and that they always strive

*A dissertation submitted to the Catholic University of America in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

¹³⁸*Academical Questions*, p. 241.

to persevere in that state in which they are while it is suitable to them."¹³⁹

Shelley has the same thought:

Throughout this varied and eternal world
Soul is the only element; the block
That for uncounted ages has remained
The moveless pillar of a mountain's weight
Is active living spirit. Every grain
Is sentient both in unity and part
And the minutest atom comprehends
A world of loves and hatreds.¹⁴⁰

Again in a letter to Miss Hitchener, November 24, 1811: "Yet that flower has a soul; for what is soul but that which makes an organized being to be what it is? . . . I will say then that all nature is animated; that microscopic vision, as it has discovered to us millions of animated beings, so might it, if extended, find that nature itself was but a mass of organized animation."

Southey told Shelley that he was a pantheist and not an atheist. He (Southey) says: "I ought not to call myself an atheist, since in reality I believe that the universe is God." "Pantheism in its narrower and proper philosophic sense is any system which expressly (not merely by implication) regards the finite world as simply a mode, limitation, part or aspect of the one eternal being; and of such a nature, that from the standpoint of this Being no distinct existence can be attributed to it."¹⁴¹ In so far as Shelley gives to nature the attributes of God he is a pantheist. This he often does. Thus, in *Julian and Maddalo*, "sacred nature"; in *The Revolt of Islam*, V, II, "dread nature"; and in the *Refutation of Deism* he speaks of "divine nature." Often though he distinguishes between God and Nature; and in this respect differs from Spinoza and those who are pantheists in the stricter use of the term. Thus in *The Revolt of Islam*, IX, 14, "by God and nature and necessity."

There is another difference between the pantheism of Shelley and that of Spinoza. Shelley does not make any difference

¹³⁹*Academical Questions*, p. 258.

¹⁴⁰*Queen Mab*, IV, p. 15.

¹⁴¹Baldwin, J. M.: *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, 1902.

between men, animals and plants. They are all about on the same level. Spinoza on the other hand makes man the king and center of the Universe.

Shelley may have gotten his pantheistic views from Volney and Holbach as well as from Drummond. In the *Système de la Nature*, II, c. VI, we read: "Tout nous prouve donc que ce n'est pas hors de la nature que nous devons chercher la Divinité. Quand nous voudrions en avoir une idée, disons que la nature est Dieu."

A characteristic of his later pantheism is that it identifies God with love. "Great Spirit, deepest love! Which rulest and dost move all things which live and are."¹⁴² Again, "O Power! . . . thou which interpenetratest all things and without which this glorious world were a blind and formless chaos, Love, author of good, God, King, Father."¹⁴³

Plato mounts up from sensuous love to intellectual love, and so does Shelley. In the *Defence of Poetry*, III, s. 125, he shows us how another great poet accomplished this. "His (Dante's) apotheosis of Beatrice in Paradise and the gradations of his own love and her loveliness, by which as by steps he feigns himself to have ascended to the throne of the Supreme cause, is the most glorious imagination of modern poetry." One would be in this highest stage, according to Spinoza, when one has attained the intellectual love of God. "This intellectual love of God is the highest kind of virtue and it not only makes man free, but it confers immortality."¹⁴⁴

Shelley makes all things love one another. Thus in *Adonais*:

All baser things pant with life's sacred thirst;
Diffuse themselves; and spend in love's delight,
The beauty and the joy of their renewed might (st. 19).

This harmonizes with his earlier views concerning inanimate objects. We saw he believed that they all had life, that they were all possessed of the "Spirit of Nature." In *Prometheus Unbound* he speaks of "this true, fair world of things a sea reflecting love." Love draws man to man. It is the *sine qua non* of man's existence. His love is founded in beauty as per-

¹⁴²*Ode to Naples*, Epode II. E.

¹⁴³*Coliseum*, III, 6.

¹⁴⁴Turner: *History of Philosophy*, p. 483.

ceived by the senses. The Spirit of Beauty and the Spirit of Love are one.

Great Spirit, *deepest Love!*

Which rulest and dost move

All things which live and are

. . . Who sittest in thy star o'er Ocean's western floor
Spirit of Beauty.¹⁴⁵

We love that which is beautiful. "Love is a going out of one's own nature, or an identification of ourselves with the beautiful which exists in thought, action or person not our own."¹⁴⁶ The beauty of the world leads us step by step to the love of pure Beauty, Love itself. In the *Symposium*, Diotima explains how the love of beautiful objects leads on to the conception of perfect abstract beauty, "eternal unproduced, indestructible. . . . All other things are beautiful through a participation of it When any one ascending from the correct system of Love begins to contemplate this supreme beauty he already touches the consummation of his labor."¹⁴⁷ The earth is not Beauty, Love, Divinity itself; it is but the shadow of God.

How glorious are thou, Earth! And if thou be
The shadow of some spirit lovelier still.¹⁴⁸

Again

The awful shadow of some unseen Power
Floats unseen amongst us.¹⁴⁹

This reminds us of platonism. The "Spirit" is the Idea, and the "shadow" is the earth. Plato's Idea transcends the world of concrete existence. The two functions of the Idea are to cause things to be known and to constitute their reality. It is at the same time one and many.¹⁵⁰ It stood out most prominently in the mind of Plato as the Idea of Good or Beauty by which he meant God Himself. He says that the shadow of the power of intellectual Beauty inspires us and not intellec-

¹⁴⁵*Ode to Naples*, Epode II, B.

¹⁴⁶*Def. of Poetry*, III, 3.

¹⁴⁷Forman's ed. *Prose Works*, Vol. III, p. 219.

¹⁴⁸*Prom. Unbound*, Act. II. sc. 3, p. 267.

¹⁴⁹*Hymn to Intellectual Beauty*.

¹⁵⁰Turner, p. 102.

tual Beauty itself. We could not endure that. Intellectual Beauty is God.

Since then Shelley's Great Spirit, Spirit of Nature, Light, Beauty, Love, resembles the "Ideas" of Plato very closely, and since these Ideas have been identified by St. Augustine and other Christian platonists with the "mind of God," it is doubtful that Shelley was an atheist in the strict sense of the term. His poetry at least will tend to imbue us with a realization of God's Presence.

That Light whose smile kindles the Universe,
That Beauty in which all things work and move,
That Benediction which the eclipsing curse
Of birth can quench not, that sustaining Love
Which through the web of being blindly wove
By man and beast and earth and air and sea.
Burns bright or dim, as each are mirrors of
The fire for which all thirst; now beams on me,
Consuming the last clouds of cold mortality.¹⁵¹

In his later years Shelley became more and more of an idealist. Towards the beginning of 1812 he became acquainted with Berkeley's writings at the instance of Southey. Ideas, according to Berkeley, are communicated to the mind through the immediate operation of the Deity without the intervention of any actual matter. All our ideas are words which God speaks to us. Matter is only a perception of the mind.

———this Whole

Of suns, and worlds, and men, and beasts, and flowers,
With all the silent or tempestuous workings
By which they have been, are, or cease to be,
Is but a vision; all that it inhabits
Are motes of a sick eye, bubbles and dreams;
Thought is its cradle and its grave, nor less
The future and the past are idle shadows
Of thoughts eternal flight—they have no being:
Nought is but that which feels itself to be.¹⁵²

When Panthea, in *Prometheus Unbound*, describes to Asia a mysterious dream, suddenly Asia sees another shape pass between her and the "golden dew" which gleams through its substance. "What is it?" she asks. "It is mine other dream,"

¹⁵¹*Adonais*, st. 54.

¹⁵²*Hellas*.

replies Panthea. "It disappears," exclaims Asia. "It passes now into my mind," replies Panthea. To Shelley dreams are as visible as the dreamers, and our minds are simply a collection of dreams. Reality is reduced to the unsubstantiality of a dream, and dreams are the only reality.

With regard to his belief in the immortality of the soul, we have the same difficulty and the same solution. All that we see or know, he says, perishes, and although life and thought differ from everything else, still this distinction does not afford us any proof that it survives that period beyond which we have no experience of its existence. The quotations, though, which can be twisted into an expression of disbelief in the immortality of the soul¹⁵³ are less numerous than those expressing disbelief in the existence of God. His writings teem with expressions of belief in existence after death. "You have witnessed one suspension of intellect in dreamless sleep . . . you witness another in death. From the first, you well know that you cannot infer any diminution of intellectual force. How contrary then to all analogy to infer annihilation from death."¹⁵⁴ Again, "Whatever may be his true and final destination there is a spirit within him at enmity with nothing and dissolution."¹⁵⁵

Plato claimed that the soul preexisted long before it was united to the body. In its supercelestial home "the soul enjoyed a clear and unclouded vision of ideas; and that, although it fell from that happy state and was steeped in the river of forgetfulness it still retains an indistinct memory of those heavenly intuitions of the truth."¹⁵⁶ Shelley was so impressed with the truth of this theory that he once walked up to a woman who was carrying a child in her arms and asked her if her child would tell them anything about preexistence. He believed that after death the soul returns to Plato's world of Ideas whence it came.

Whilst burning through the inmost veil of heaven
The soul of Adonais, like a star
Beacons from the abode where the eternal are.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵³Cf. Shelley's *Essay on a Future State*.

¹⁵⁴Letter to Eliz. Hitchener, June 25, 1811.

¹⁵⁵*Essay on Life*.

¹⁵⁶Turner: *History of Philosophy*, p. 110.

¹⁵⁷*Adonais*, st. 55.

As to the nature of the soul his early views reflect the influence of Dr. G. Aberthney, who believed in a kind of universal animism. On January 6, 1811, he writes to Hogg: "I think we may not inaptly define *soul* as the most supreme, superior and distinguished abstract appendage to the nature of anything." Again, "I conceive (and as is certainly capable of demonstration) that nothing can be annihilated, but that everything appertaining to nature, consisting of constituent parts infinitely divisible, is in a continual change, then do I suppose—and I think I have a right to draw this inference—that neither will soul perish."¹⁵⁸

In *Queen Mab* we find Shelley believing in the doctrine of necessity. There he denies the freedom of the will. Later on he exempted the will from the law of necessity, but not the intelligence or reason of man. His views on this subject were derived principally from Godwin. "Every human being," says Godwin, "is irresistably impelled to act precisely as he does act. In the eternity which preceded his birth a chain of causes was generated, which, operating under the name of motives, make it impossible that any thought of his mind and any action of his life should be otherwise than it is."¹⁵⁹

The actions of every human being are determined by the dictates of reason; and, like the operations of nature, are subject to the law of necessity. This idea of necessity is obtained from our experience of the uniformity of the phenomena of nature. Similar causes invariably produce the same effect. In the material world an immense chain of causes and effects appears, the connection between which we cannot understand. The same thing is true of the moral world. There, motive is to voluntary action what cause is to effect in the physical order. A man cannot resist the strongest motive any more than a stone left unsuspended can remain in the air. Will is simply an act of the judgment determined by logical impressions. The murderer is no more responsible for his deed than the knife with which the crime was committed. Both were set in motion from without; the knife, by material impulse; the man, by inducement and persuasion. To hate a murderer,

¹⁵⁸June 20, 1811.

¹⁵⁹*Political Justice*, Book VI. 11.

then, is as unreasonable as to hate his weapon. Educate him, but do not punish. In the material world

No atom of this turbulence fulfills
A vague and unnecessitated chance,
Or acts but as it must and ought to act.¹⁰⁰

In the same way

Not a thought, a will, an act,
No working of the tyrant's moody mind,
Nor one misgiving of the slaves who boast
Their servitude, to hide the shame they feel,
Nor the events enchainning every will,
That from the depths of unrecorded time
Have drawn all-influencing virtue, pass
Unrecognized, or unforeseen by thee,
Soul of the Universe!¹⁰¹

In his notes to *Queen Mab*, Shelley admits that the doctrine of necessity tends to introduce a great change into the established notions of morality, and utterly to destroy Religion. It teaches that no event could happen but as it did happen; and that if God is the author of good He is also the author of evil.

Shelley soon broke away from the teaching of Godwin and Spinoza with regard to the freedom of the will. He maintained that the will is unrestrainedly free and that man is his own master. Thus, "Man whose will has power when all beside is gone" (*The Revolt*, VIII, 16). "Such intent as renovates the world a will omnipotent" (*Ibid.*, II, 41). "Who if ye dared might not aspire less than ye conceive of power" (*Ibid.*, XI, 16).

Man can obtain freedom if he really desires it. Godwin held that freedom from external restraints leads to freedom of the mind, whereas Shelley sees in external political freedom the blossoming forth of already obtained freedom of the soul. The interior freedom is obtained through self-abnegation and the determination of the will. Mrs. Shelley says in the introduction to *Prometheus Unbound* that Shelley believed mankind had only to will that there should be no evil and there would be none. Evil is not something inherent in creation,

¹⁰⁰*Queen Mab*, Canto VI, p. 24.

¹⁰¹*Ibid.*

but an accident that may be expelled. "But we are taught," writes Shelley, "by the doctrine of necessity, that there is neither good nor evil in the universe, otherwise than as the events to which we apply these epithets have relation to our own peculiar mode of being."¹⁶²

This view is very similar to that of Drummond. He held that order and disorder have no place but in our own imagination, and are the modes in which we survey the eternal and necessary series of things. Ideas of right and wrong depend upon the circumstances in which people are placed. They vary so much that we do not find the standard of morality to be precisely the same in any two countries of the world. Good and evil are modes of thinking; and what appears good to one person may appear bad to another, and neither good nor bad to a third. This is Spinoza's doctrine: "Bonum et malum quod attinet, nihil etiam positivum in rebus, in se scilicet consideratis, indicant, nec aliud sunt praeter cogitandi modos, seu motiones, quas formamus ex eo, quod res ad invicem comparamus nam una eademque res potest eodem tempore bona et mala, et etiam indifferens esse." *Ethics*, IV.

Shelley has two versions of the origin of good and evil. The first is manichean and represents them as twin genii of balanced power and opposite tendencies ruling the world. "This much is certain: that Jesus Christ represents God as the fountain of all goodness, the eternal enemy of pain and evil. . . . According to Jesus Christ, and according to the indisputable facts of the case, some evil spirit has dominion in this imperfect world."¹⁶³ Good is represented by the morning star and evil by a comet. According to the second version, which is Shelley's own view, evil has not the same power that good has, and came later into the world. Evil is strong because man permits it to exist, and must disappear as soon as man wills this. Since it could be entirely eliminated, it is not an integral part of the world.

Man is naturally good. His vices are the result of bad education. They are nothing but errors of judgment. Let truth prevail; educate men properly, and then vice will entirely disappear. Shelley also writes:

¹⁶²Notes to *Queen Mab*.

¹⁶³*Shelley Memorials, Essay on Christianity*, p. 283.

Let priest-led slaves cease to proclaim that man
Inherits vice and misery, when force
And falsehood hang even over the cradled babe
Stifling with rudest grasp all natural good.

Godwin thinks that the influence of the emotions and passions has been overestimated. It is not true that they can force one to act in opposition to the dictates of one's reason. They maintain their hold on men but by the ornaments with which they are decked out; and these are the things which compel a man to yield. Reduce sensual acts to their true nakedness and they would be despised. Whatever power the passions have to incline men to act will, in future, be offset by consideration of justice and self-interest. Many have overcome the influence of pain and pleasure in the past by the energies of intellectual resolution, and what these accomplished can be done by all. Reason and truth, then, are sufficient to change the whole complexion of society. They will ultimately prevail; and then all will be wise and good. The following from Shelley is an echo of this.

And when reason's voice
Loud as the voice of nature shall have waked
The nations; and mankind perceive that vice
Is discord, war, and misery; that virtue
Is peace and happiness and harmony

XX

How sweet a scene will earth become!
Of purest spirits a pure dwelling-place,
Symphonious with the planetary spheres.

Godwin went so far as to say that eventually all sickness would disappear; and even in this Shelley follows his master. Shelley finds this view of evil in the teaching of Christ. "According to Jesus Christ," he writes, "some evil spirit has dominion in this imperfect world. But there will come a time when the human mind shall be visited exclusively by the influence of the benignant power."¹⁰⁴

All the philosophists who influenced Shelley agreed in this that virtue leads to happiness. The purpose of virtuous con-

¹⁰⁴*Essay on Christianity.*

duct, says Godwin, "is the production of happiness." So with Shelley "virtue is peace, and happiness, and harmony." Virtue, says Godwin, is the offspring of the understanding; and vice is always the result of narrow views. "Selfishness," writes Shelley, "is the offspring of ignorance and mistake; . . . disinterested benevolence is the product of a cultivated imagination, and has an intimate connection with all the arts which add ornament or dignity or power, or stability to the social state of man."¹⁶⁵

Shelley does not believe in the existence of hell. He thinks that this doctrine is incompatible with the goodness of God. "Love your enemies, bless those who curse you, that ye may be the sons of your Heavenly Father, Who makes the sun to shine on the good and the evil, and the rain to fall on the just and unjust." How monstrous a calumny have not impostors dared to advance against the mild and gentle author of this just sentiment, and against the whole tenor of his doctrines and his life overflowing with benevolence and forbearance and compassion."¹⁶⁶ God, he says, would only be gratifying his revenge under pretence of satisfying justice were he to inflict pain upon another for no better reason than that he deserved it.

CHAPTER V.

RADICALISM IN CONTEMPORARY POETRY

A poet is the product of his time. Shelley observes that there is a resemblance, which does not depend on their own will, between the writers of any particular age. They are all subjected to a common influence "which arises out of a combination of circumstances belonging to the time in which they live, though each is in a degree the author of the very influence by which his being is thus pervaded." Hence it is that the works of any poet cannot be thoroughly appreciated unless the spirit that pervaded the life of the period be understood. This is particularly true of the poetry of Shelley. It embodies the aspirations and ideals of the philosophers of his time. Its themes are liberty, justice and revolt. On every side are heard

¹⁶⁵*Speculations on Morals*, Vol. II, prose works, p. 260.

¹⁶⁶*Shelley Memorials*. *Essay on Christianity*, p. 279.

protests against conventionality, against government, and against religion. The philosophers of the French Revolution are hailed as the saviors of society and their theories put forth as a panacea for all human ills. Shelley is the high water mark of the waves of revolt which threatened to inundate the country. A brief investigation, then, of the poetical atmosphere of the end of the eighteenth century will help us in our study of the sources of his radicalism.

There can be no doubt but contemporary literature had some influence on his sensitive nature. "The writings of the future laureate (Southey) as likewise of Wordsworth and Coleridge, and Landor's *Gehir* were among those for which Shelley in early youth had a particular predilection."¹⁶⁷ Since the influence of Southey soon began to decline on account of his fulsome praise of George III, we shall confine our attention to Wordsworth and Coleridge. "One word in candor," Shelley writes, "on the manner in which the study of contemporary writing may have modified my composition. I am intimately persuaded that the peculiar style of intensive and comprehensive imagery in poetry which distinguishes modern writers has not been as a general power the product of the imitation of any particular one. It is impossible that any one contemporary with such writers (Wordsworth and Coleridge were specified at first) as stand in the front ranks of literature of the present day can conscientiously assure themselves or others that their *language* and *tone of thought* may not have been modified by the study of the productions of these extraordinary intellects."¹⁶⁸

Radicalism, we said, was the characteristic of this period and this extended both to the form and the matter of poetry. Byron characterizes one eminent poet as "the mild apostate from poetic rule."¹⁶⁹

During the greater part of the eighteenth century conservatism and classicism were in the ascendant. After the Revolution of 1688 everything medieval and Catholic was looked upon with suspicion. Old customs and festivities were allowed

¹⁶⁷W. M. Rossetti: *Memoir of Shelley*, p. 33.

¹⁶⁸Shelley's notebook. Printed for W. K. Bixby, St. Louis, 1911.

¹⁶⁹*English Bards and Scotch Reviewers*.

to fall into disuse. Compared with the past it was a material age. In the early part of the century agriculture and commerce flourished and with this advance in material prosperity came the decline of romanticism. "Correctness" in form and thought is the guiding light of prince and peasant, of poet and philosopher. Imagination is concerned almost entirely with society and fine manners. Pope's themes are beaux and belles, pomatum, billets-doux, and patches. He preferred the artificial to the natural. Form, imitation of the classics, is to him and the men of that period, the all important matter in literature. In his *Essay on Criticism* he tells us again and again

Learn hence for ancient rules a just esteem
To copy nature is to copy them.

"To his immediate successors Pope was the grand exemplar of what a poet should be,"¹⁷⁰ but unfortunately he was followed by a horde of imitators whose only claim on the muse of poetry was ability to turn out heroic couplets. As a consequence poetry became a cold, lifeless affair, devoid of imagination and "divorced from living nature and the warm spontaneity of the heart."¹⁷¹

A reaction against this pseudo-classicism was inevitable. That small but constantly flowing stream of romanticism which is found in the works of Thomson, Blake, Warton and Gray, increased in size until it broke loose in the *Lyrical Ballads* of 1798. This was the joint work of Coleridge and Wordsworth. The two poets met for the first time in 1796. Coleridge was then 24 years of age and Wordsworth but two years his senior. In July, 1797, Wordsworth and his sister moved to Alfoxden, in Somersetshire, that they might be near Coleridge, who was living with his wife at Nether-Stowey. They were, as Coleridge has said somewhere, three people but one soul. A good description of the relationship between them is given in Dorothy Wordsworth's *Alfoxden Journal*, and in Coleridge's *The Nightingale*; a conversation poem. Their most frequent topic of conversation was "the power of exciting the sympathy of the reader by a faithful adherence to the

¹⁷⁰P. J. Lennox in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. XII.

¹⁷¹T. Arnold; *Manual of English Literature*, p. 304.

truth of nature, and the power of giving the interest of novelty by the modifying colors of imagination."¹⁷² From these conversations originated the plan of the *Lyrical Ballads*. The work was divided into two parts. Coleridge was to direct his attention to romantic and supernatural characters and to enshroud these with a human interest and a semblance of truth sufficient to engage our interest and attention. Wordsworth, on the other hand, was to produce the same effect by giving the charm of novelty to objects chosen from ordinary life. It seemed to them that the beauty of a landscape often depended on the accidents of light and shade; that moonlight or sunset sometimes transformed an uninviting scene into one of entrancing beauty; and so they believed that they could diffuse the glow of their imagination over any object and make it attractive. As might be expected the publication of the *Ballads* did not meet with success. The change from the stereotyped verse of the age to these carelessly formed effusions was too much for the critics. Some scoffed at them; others thought they were being hoaxed. The subjects dealt with in these poems were long considered as unfit for poetry; and of course the conservative felt it his bounden duty to protest against the innovation. In the second edition of the *Ballads*, which was entirely Wordsworth's own work, an attempt is made to justify this radical departure from the beaten path. A poet, he explains, is a genius, and should not be hampered by any conventions of art or traditions of society. His imagination is the purifying fire which transmutes the rough ore of the commonplace into the choice gold of literature. "Good poetry," he writes, "is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings." "He (the poet) is a man speaking to men; a man, it is true, endowed with more lively sensibility, more enthusiasm and tenderness, who has a greater knowledge of human nature and a more comprehensive soul, than are supposed to be common among mankind; a man pleased with his own passions and volitions, and who rejoices more than other men in the spirit of life that is in him; delighting to contemplate similar volitions and passions as manifested in the goings of the universe,

¹⁷²Coleridge: *Biographia Literaria*, Ch. XIV.

and habitually impelled to create them where he does not find them."¹⁷³ This is a good picture of Shelley. "With a spiritual gaze turned first inward, on his own passions and volitions, and then turned outward upon the universe, Shelley looked in vain for external objects answering to the forms generated by his dazzling imagination."¹⁷⁴

Meter and poetic diction, Wordsworth says, are something altogether accidental to poetry, and consequently there is no essential difference between the language of poetry and that of prose. "The distinction," Shelley writes, "between poets and prose writers is a vulgar error. Plato was essentially a poet."¹⁷⁵ Wordsworth contends, too, that the proper language of poetry is the ordinary language of the rustic. The excellence of poetry depends not so much on the dignity of the words used as on their capacity to arouse emotions. "The language of poets," Shelley writes, "is vitally metaphorical; that is, it marks the before-unapprehended relations of things and perpetuates their apprehension; until words which represent them, become, through time, signs for portions or classes of thought instead of pictures of integral thoughts. . . . Every original language near to its source is in itself the chaos of a cyclic poem."¹⁷⁶

Not only Shelley's principles as regards "the use of language" but also his "tone of thought" was influenced by Wordsworth. Coleridge and Wordsworth removed the sphere of poetry from social action to philosophical reflection; they exchanged the ancient method, consisting in the ideal imitation of external objects, for an introspective analysis of the impressions of the individual mind.¹⁷⁷ Many of Wordsworth's poems are records of the moods of his own soul, and of phases of his life; so also are Shelley's. A brief examination of some of Wordsworth's works will serve to make this clear.

Wordsworth planned an epic poem, *The Recluse*, of which *The Prelude*, or introduction, and *The Excursion* are the only

¹⁷³Preface to *Lyrical Ballads*.

¹⁷⁴*Courthope*, Vol. VI, p. 314.

¹⁷⁵Shelley's *Defence of Poetry*, p. 9.

¹⁷⁶*Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹⁷⁷*Courthope: History of Poetry*, Vol. VI, p. 192.

parts extant. In these two poems we can trace out the history of his radicalism. *The Prelude* is his autobiography; and *The Excursion* supplements what is lacking to a thorough revelation of the workings of his mind. He begins *The Prelude* by telling about his childhood and schooltime, his residence at Cambridge, vacation and love for books. He then treats of his first trip to the Continent and his residence in London. Book IX is concerned with his second visit to France in 1791. While there he mixed up with all classes

. . . and thus ere long
Became a patriot; and my heart was all
Given to the people, and my love was theirs."¹⁷⁸

It was natural for him to do so, because he lived from boyhood among those whose claims on one's respect did not rest on accidents of wealth or blood. He describes his friend General Beaupis, who inoculated him with enthusiasm for the cause of the Revolution. In *The Revolt of Islam* Shelley describes Dr. Lind, who taught him to curse the king. Hatred of absolute rule, where the will of one is law for all, was becoming stronger in Wordsworth every day. After the September massacres and the imprisonment of the king he returned to Paris.

And ranged with ardor heretofore unfelt
The spacious city.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁸*Riverside Edition*, p. 217.

¹⁷⁹*Ibid.*, p. 239.

(To be continued)

THE LIMITATIONS OF THE EDUCATIONAL
THEORY OF JOHN LOCKE ESPECIALLY
FOR THE CHRISTIAN TEACHER*

(Continued)

5. PLAY AND EXERCISE

When reading Locke's ideas about "play games," we are impressed with the meagreness of his instructions. We fail to find in them any principles that tend to the making of manly characters. Evidently, the custom that prevailed in his day was to give "play things," childish in their nature and better fitted for girls than boys. He speaks about "tops, gigs, battledores, and the like," and counsels that "all the plays and diversions of children should be directed towards good and useful habits, or else they introduce ill ones. Whatever they do, leaves some impression on that tender age, and from thence receive a tendency to good or evil; and whatever hath such influence, ought not to be neglected."¹⁴⁸ Nothing specific is said about out-door exercise or play, especially through those out-door games for which nature calls. Our physiologists and educators demand these sports and give reasons therefor.

"For the best results in childhood days, nature calls for play rather than work. The out-door play of children tends to develop the larger and freer bodily movements. It enlarges the lungs; it strengthens the heart; it promotes circulation; it gives grace and suppleness to the figure; it provides varied activities which flow from native well-springs of interest; and it thus lays the foundation for finer adjustments and for a higher development of the whole being; and above all it tends

*A dissertation submitted to the Catholic Sisters College of the Catholic University of America in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

¹⁴⁸Sec. 130.

to put the child in a condition to sustain some of the inevitable strains which he will meet in the schoolroom. The work begun in the play of childhood should be completed by the games and athletic sports which find legitimate place in the latter portion of the educative process not only as means of perfecting physical development but as valuable means of forming character and developing necessary social qualities."¹⁴⁹

Although Locke was a physician as well as a great sufferer, he nowhere gives any rules concerning the means of securing physical development, nor how to adjust conditions to meet the requirements for the preservation of the health of the child, suitable to the needs of civilized life. It is true that he advocated the "hardening" process, but that does not satisfy science. Health is the great question of our day and nothing is left undone to secure it for all. Physicians and educators are working in harmony to obtain it for the children attending school, and devise excellent means and processes to attain that end.

The saying of Montaigne, which is sometimes quoted as a watchword by the advocates of physical culture, that "we have not to train up a soul nor yet a body, but a man, and we cannot divide him," expresses a truth which lies at the basis of rational education. It is, indeed, the strongest plea for systematic training of the body that it help in the harmonious development of the whole man.

Apart from its effect mentally and its value morally, in teaching discipline, obedience, and courage, physical education, according to Georges Demeny, a noted French authority, has three objects: "to confirm health, to give a harmonious development of the body, and to teach how to best utilize the muscular force in the different applications which are demanded in life."¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁹Shields, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

¹⁵⁰*Apud*. Pyle, *op. cit.*, p. 333.

After proving the essential superiority of play to gymnastics, Spencer says: "Granting then, as we do, that formal exercises of the limbs are better than nothing—granting further, that they may be used with advantage as supplementary aids; we yet contend that such formal exercises can never supply the place of the exercises prompted by nature. For girls, as well as for boys, the sportive activities to which the instincts impel, are essential to bodily welfare. Whoever forbids them, forbids the divinely appointed means to physical development."¹⁵¹

6. PHYSICAL EDUCATION OF GIRLS

Although Locke gives no specific instruction for the education of girls, he hints that "the nearer they come to the hardships of their brothers in their education, the greater advantages will they receive from it all the remaining part of their lives."¹⁵² In Locke's time the physical education of girls was almost *nil*. In the United States this matter has received considerable attention, and the system of physical training of girls is being improved every year. Indeed, it cannot be too strongly insisted upon that games and exercises which strengthen the muscles, enlarge the chest, and assist all the digestive operations, are not only as beneficial to girls as to boys, but need to be made ever more a special study in the case of the former, since girls do not spontaneously attend to this part of their education with the energy of the other sex.

It has been said that when you educate a boy you may be training a man, but when you educate a girl you may be educating a family. It is useless to press the claims of health and physical training, to aim for better bodies and higher physical development if the future

¹⁵¹Op. cit., p. 280.

¹⁵²Sec. 9.

mothers are not considered. Their physical training is of more importance than that of man.¹⁵³

Hence, the first aim, which should dominate physical education should be health—a momentous word that looms up beside holiness, to which it is etymologically akin. Only those who realize what advances have been made in health culture, especially since the days of Locke, and know something of its vast new literature can realize what this means. The health of woman is, as we have seen, if possible even more important for the welfare of the race than that of man, and the influence of her body upon her mind is, in a sense, greater, so that its needs should be supreme and primary. Foods should favor the completest digestion, so that metabolism be on the highest plane. The dietary should be abundant, plain and varied, and cooked with all the refinements possible in the modern cooking school, with limited use of rich foods and stimulating drinks, but with wholesome proximity to dairy and farm. Nutrition is the first law of health and happiness.¹⁵⁴

The principle sometimes advocated, that the same methods of physical training should apply to boys and girls without regard to sex, should be reversed and every possible adjustment made to sex. Free plays and games should always have precedence over indoor or uniform *commando* exercises. Boating and basket-ball should be allowed, but with the competition element sedulously reduced, and with dancing of many kinds and forms the most prominent indoor exercises. Golf and tennis are games that should hold a place in the physical culture of our girls.¹⁵⁵

Speaking of the influence of carriage and dress on digestion, Dr. Stockton states that one of the most common causes of sluggishness in hepatic circulation and

¹⁵³Knauff, T. C., *Athletics for Physical Culture*, p. 395.

¹⁵⁴Hall, *Adolescence*, Vol. II, p. 637.

¹⁵⁵*Ibid.*, p. 638.

secretion, as well as of the disturbances of the intestines and other portions of the digestive apparatus, may be attributed to faulty carriage of the body and relaxation of the abdominal muscles, lessening the abdominal type of respiration, and consequently the loss of diaphragmatic motion. All of these conditions are very much aggravated, and some of them are directly induced by the improper dress almost universally adopted by women, and to some extent by children.

Now, for the correct performance of function on the part of the stomach, liver, and intestines, it is necessary that free and properly selected movements of these organs should take place. Such movements are impossible in the majority of women. The defects are so common, and the deformities of the body necessarily associated with them, begin so early in life, that they are largely overlooked, and are argued to be natural and beautiful by the mass of womankind.¹⁵⁶

Locke's criticism of "strait-lacing"¹⁵⁷ is sustained by our present-day scientists. Thus, Dr. Stockton affirms that this condition more than any other cause is responsible for the constipation, backache, debility, biliousness, early loss of complexion, headache, and that long list of ailments of which so many women in all civilized countries are victims.¹⁵⁸

In conclusion we say that the adjustments called for to secure adequate physical education for all boys and girls, are difficult and will tax the resources of all available educative agencies. "The very virtues of civilization," says Dr. Bagley, "impose upon everyone who lives the social life the paradoxical obligation to break nature's laws. How to get the most out of life with the least suffering, how to do the best work with the least

¹⁵⁶Cf. Pyle, *op. cit.*, pp. 45, 46 ff.

¹⁵⁷Sec. 11.

¹⁵⁸Vide Pyle, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

drain, how to be human and civilized and still to be a healthy animal, are problems that can only approximate solution through comparison. When the best life entails no physical suffering, when the best work can be done without danger of nervous breakdown, when civilization and culture fail to demand some violation of primitive laws, man will have developed into a being that will have little bodily resemblance to his present self."¹⁵⁹

To Locke is due the credit of being among the first to give due attention as well as consideration to the care of the physical well-being of the child. Personal experience, no doubt, contributed largely to the high value he placed upon the health of the body, and wrought in him a ready sympathy for the physical weakling for whom he sought strength and vigor in a clean, simple, and natural mode of life. That his theories will here and there fall short in the light of present developments in the science of physiology, hygiene, and physical training, is to be expected. But if we disregard a few minor points, such as his insistence on "leaky" shoes, we shall find that his prescriptions of a plain diet, fresh air, plenty of sleep, proper clothing, and hard beds, need as much emphasis today as in Locke's time, and the passing moods and tempers of children, that teachers must reckon with, are facts as important now as then.

CHAPTER IV

CRITICISM OF LOCKE'S THEORY OF MORAL TRAINING

Locke says "the great principle and foundation of all virtue and worth is placed in this: That a man is able to *deny himself* his own desires, cross his own inclinations, and purely follow what reason directs as best, though the appetite lean the other way."¹⁶⁰

Having pointed out the ways in which he considered

¹⁵⁹Bagley, *The Educative Process*, p. 336.

¹⁶⁰*Thoughts*, Sec. 33.

that the body could be best fitted "to obey and execute the orders of the mind," Locke proceeded to set forth his views as to the ways in which "to set the mind right, that on all occasions it may be disposed to consent to nothing but what may be suitable to the dignity and excellency of a rational creature."¹⁰¹

Thus we see that the foundation of moral training is habit, which must, later on, qualify the child to obey his reason. The basis of all virtue is *the ability to practice self-denial*; hence, children should not be given anything simply because they desire it vehemently. They should, on the contrary, achieve the permanent experience that ardent desires are followed by denial and privation. Whilst the reason of the child is, as yet, unable to distinguish, the authority of the intelligent parent should intervene. If respect for parental authority is early developed, reasonable indulgence can be allowed to hold sway. The esteem, and the loss of esteem of the family and relatives, are the means that should be used to induce children to do well, until they arrive at the point of acting virtuously in order to satisfy the sense of duty. Blows and servile punishments should be avoided; these repress the spirit. If such means are used to force children to do what is right, they will not do it out of inclination, but only to avoid a greater evil. In like manner, rewards may induce children to do what we desire of them, simply through avarice and sensual pleasure.

Locke says, "I place *virtue* as the first and most necessary of those endowments that belong to a man or a gentleman; as absolutely requisite to make him valued and beloved by others, acceptable or tolerable to himself. Without that, I think, he will be happy neither in this nor the other world."¹⁰² Although Locke considers *virtue* the first and most necessary of those

¹⁰¹Sec. 31.

¹⁰²Sec. 135.

endowments that belong to a man or gentleman, he urges its absolute necessity on the ground of utility. For if he possess not virtue, he cannot be valued and beloved by others, and hence the motive for practicing virtue is the *Ego*. It is true that Locke adds that without virtue, man would not be happy here or hereafter. However, the utilitarian motive is primary, while the supernatural aim is obscured.

Locke, in inculcating the acquisition of virtue, seems to have in mind,

(1) "Self-restraint." He says, "as the strength of the body lies chiefly in being able to endure hardships, so also does that of the mind. And the great principle and foundation of all virtue and worth is placed in this, that a man has to deny himself his own desires," etc.¹⁶³ "He that has not a mastery over his inclinations, he that knows not how to resist the importunity of present pleasure or pain for the sake of what reason tells him is fit to be done, wants the true principle of virtue and industry and is in danger never to be good for anything."¹⁶⁴

(2) Submission to the authority of parent and teacher. "Would you have your son obedient to you when past a child? Be sure, then, to establish the authority of a father as soon as he is capable of submission."¹⁶⁵

The first step in moral training is to make the child gradually familiar with the idea of God as Creator and Ruler of the Universe. The next step is to teach the habit of daily prayer.¹⁶⁶ Then, keep him strictly to speak the truth, and by all ways imaginable inclining him to be good natured.¹⁶⁷ Here, he observes that "all injustice generally springs from too great love of ourselves and

¹⁶³Sec. 33.

¹⁶⁴Sec. 45.

¹⁶⁵Sec. 40.

¹⁶⁶Sec. 136.

¹⁶⁷Sec. 139.

too little for others." These are general principles. For the rest, "as the child grows up the tendency of his natural inclination must be observed," and the particular virtues must be developed, and remedies for the particular vices applied according to the child's nature."¹⁶⁸

The virtues inculcated express and advocate the true ideal of human nature. "The solid and substantial good," "the glory and strength" of man, his only essential happiness, the excellence which makes a man "valued and beloved by others and acceptable or tolerable to himself."¹⁶⁹

Locke defines habit as "that facility in doing anything which is acquired by practice,"¹⁷⁰ and also "The power or ability in man of doing anything, when it has been acquired by frequently doing the same thing."¹⁷¹

Now, in the development of the Christian character, and therefore in the formation of the typical youth, habit has a rôle of surpassing importance. It must transform instinctive behavior, and make it the servant or the ally not only of right reason and ethical conduct, but of a life conformed to Christian standards. In the accomplishment of this task, there are successive stages of perfection to be attained according as the essence of the new habit is concerned with the substitution of a new feeling for the old instinctive attitude, or a new response, or a new object for both feeling and response. After the example of his divine Master, the Christian youth must be able to say: *Behold I make all things new.*¹⁷² The first element is the sensory impression, which is also the indispensable condition of the other two elements, so in the acquisition of Christian virtue, the first requisite is a knowledge of the truths of faith.

¹⁶⁸Ibid.

¹⁶⁹Sec. 70.

¹⁷⁰*Thoughts*, Sec. 66.

¹⁷¹Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Vol. 1., p. 387.

¹⁷²Apoc. XXI. 5.

Again, the law of habit reigns in the moral order as truly as the law of gravitation in the physical. The most difficult things become easy in time. It would be as difficult for a saint after long habits of virtue suddenly to fall into mortal sin, as it would be for a man living for years in habits of vice suddenly to become a saint. The law of habit presses upon the will, driving it into the channel which it has cut for itself, and making it more and more difficult to divert its course.

Habit can only be conquered by habit. The youth must form good habits to conquer bad, habits of resistance to overcome cowardly habits of surrender. It is not by violent and spasmodic efforts at self-assertion that he will overcome, but by steady and unremitting efforts at perseverance.

Locke does not strictly define virtue in the *Thoughts*. In the Essay, two definitions are given.¹⁷³ (1) "Virtue is the best worship of God." (2) "If virtue be taken, as most commonly it is for these actions, which according to different opinions of several countries are accounted laudable." These words may be taken as Locke's formal definition of virtue. The supernatural element is ignored in the definition. It is only in the opinions of several countries that acts are constituted virtues. It is no concern of Locke's whether God does or does not approve such acts. His idea is to bring up the child according to the natural or egotistic conception of virtue. Such was the practice of the pagan philosophers of old, who practiced virtue that they might be esteemed by men.

Virtue, taken in its widest sense, means the excellence or perfection of a thing, just as vice, its contrary, denotes a defect or absence of perfection due to a thing. Virtue, in its strictest sense, as used by moralists and

¹⁷³Vol. I, pp. 82, 83.

theologians, signifies a habit superadded to a faculty of the soul, disposing it to elicit with readiness, acts conformable to our rational nature. Virtue has this in common with vice, that is, it disposes a potency to a certain determined activity; but it differs specifically from it in that it disposes it to good acts, *i. e.*, acts in consonance with right reason. We distinguish virtues, as intellectual, moral, and theological.

An intellectual virtue is a quality of the natural order. This quality may be *speculative*, as wisdom, science, understanding; and *practical* as art and prudence. And moral virtue is that which perfects the appetitive faculty.

We distinguish between intellectual and moral virtues. Intellectual virtue gives the facility, whereas moral virtue not only gives the facility, but the right use of facility. Justice, fortitude, and temperance, are moral virtues. Moreover, moral virtue regulates man in his dealings with others, as justice, fortitude, and temperance. It also regulates man in regard to his inner passions, as temperance and fortitude.

A theological virtue is that which includes supernatural, as well as natural, happiness. It is that power which secures to the individual natural happiness, which is attained by his own natural powers. The theological virtues are faith, hope, and charity. They are called theological, (1) because they have God for their immediate and proper object; (2) because they are divinely infused; and (3) because they are known only through divine revelation. A theological virtue is the perfection of the intellect, faith; the perfection of the will, hope; and intellect and will combined, charity.

Virtue is not merely an external appearance, but an intrinsic reality. It does not make men act well "in order to be seen by men, but out of respect for the moral

law."¹⁷⁴ Whereas habit is the result of performing an action out of custom.

Now, the virtues which Locke advocated have for their motive no distinctly religious or Christian consideration. His principle is utilitarian, *i. e.*, for the benefit of the individual, as may be gleaned from his words, "I place virtue as the first and most necessary of those endowments that belong to a man,"¹⁷⁵ etc. Here it is obvious that the social benefit of virtue, by which a man is "beloved by others," is subordinated to individual happiness. This note is placed in the very first part of the *Thoughts* as stated above.

In the second place, Locke touches on the social value of virtues, especially when he is speaking of those virtues which are part of good breeding. This thought might be expressed in present day phraseology, by stating that the educated man fits naturally and easily into his environment. Thus, when speaking of "contradictions," "captiousness," and the like, he again refers to "not losing the esteem of others,"¹⁷⁶ "being both welcomed and valued everywhere." But, here again, he subordinates the social to the individual interest; "power and riches, nay virtue itself, are valued only as conducing to our happiness."

Again, when speaking of the virtue of obedience, Locke seemingly places it on a basis of mere utility or convenience. He says, "would you have your son obedient to you when past a child? Be sure, then, to establish the authority of a father as soon as he is capable of submission, and can understand in whose power he is."¹⁷⁷ He judges it "reasonable" that children, when young, should look upon their parents "as their lords, their absolute governors," so that, in mature years, they

¹⁷⁴Dubray, *Introductory Philosophy*, p. 360.

¹⁷⁵Sec. 135.

¹⁷⁶Sec. 143.

¹⁷⁷Sec. 40.

should love and reverence them. There is, then, question only of obedience to parents, no allusion to obedience to God and His Commandments. There is lacking that supernatural motive which makes obedience meritorious for eternal life. Nor is there any explicit reference to any sanction, except reasonableness and utility. This last is made clear, where the aim is stated to be "to make them capable to deserve the favor of their parents and the esteem of everybody else."¹⁷⁸

The virtue of charity, he reduces to humanity and civility. While he speaks of inculcating a knowledge of God, and the need of teaching children to pray to Him, he has nothing to say about the love of God.¹⁷⁹ Now, we know from a Christian viewpoint that the love of God is the foundation of true charity. It is this love of God that has made the heroes who withstood the persecutions of the emperors and thus became saints. It is this love of God that induces so many men and women to consecrate their lives to God and labor with a heroic zeal for the salvation of souls in every part of the world. It is this love of God that caused St. Augustine to say, "Love God, and then do as you please."

For, it has been well said, "He who believes humanity requires no higher influence than its own, will see in Christ no more than a man like himself; he who thinks man's only need is an example, will look upon Him as a good moral teacher. But he who feels that the need of his nature is something more than nature can supply, will seek for the supernatural in Christ."¹⁸⁰

Locke's presentation of charity falls below the high Christian ideal and gives us merely the model of some stoic philosopher, whose egoism consumed the charity which should have filled his heart for his fellow man.

¹⁷⁸Sec. 41.

¹⁷⁹Sec. 136.

¹⁸⁰Quoted by Maturin, *Self-Knowledge and Self-Discipline*, 2nd Ed., p. 81.

Locke's charity is cold and without result. It would never gain happiness hereafter.

In regard to the virtue of self-control, Locke urges that it should be commenced early. Parents should not allow their affection to degenerate into foolish fondness for their children.¹⁸¹ This again he puts on a practical and utilitarian basis. "He that is not used to submit his will to the reason of others, when he is young, will scarce hearken or submit to his own reason when he is of an age to make use of it."¹⁸²

How vastly different is the Christian conception of self-control. "Self-discipline," writes Maturin, "must necessarily be in proportion to the misuse of any sense of power, but it is the true use of it that we aim at in every act of self-discipline. 'For the joy that is set before us we endure the cross'—we do not endure it merely for its own sake, but for what lies beyond it. And we bear those acts of self-denial and self-restraint because we feel and know full well that through such acts alone can we regain the mastery over all our misused powers and learn to use them with a vigor and a joy such as we have never known before."¹⁸³

In his discussion of virtue, Locke hardly ever refers to the good of others, save to allude to virtue's reward in the "favor of parents and esteem of everybody."¹⁸⁴ In one passage, indeed, he says that "the true principle which will constantly incline them to the right" is "an apprehension of shame and disgrace."¹⁸⁵ The motive here presented by Locke is quite human and will not tend to raise man above the natural. Whereas the Christian ideal is nobler and takes for motive the supernatural, and makes all natural considerations subservient

¹⁸¹Sec. 35 ff.

¹⁸²Sec. 36.

¹⁸³Op. cit., p. 59.

¹⁸⁴Sec. 41.

¹⁸⁵Sec. 56.

thereto. The thought of practicing virtue for God's sake gives an impetus to the Christian man, and makes him realize that his reward is not in men's approbation, and hence he feels that he is what he is in God's sight despite man's judgment. But, when he treats of good breeding, Locke naturally recognizes the social side of this quality. As it is a rule of good breeding "Not to think meanly of ourselves," so it is also a rule "not to think meanly of others."¹⁸⁶

We should strive "to please" and "to show respect" to others; we should try to put others at their ease, and, what "lies deeper than the outside," we should show "general good will and regard for all people." We should "accommodate ourselves to those we have to do with," not slight them, not find fault with them, not make fun of their faults (raillery), and should not be censorious, captious, nor excessively ceremonious.¹⁸⁷ All this Locke seems to put on a basis of social justice, when he says: "The thing they should endeavor, and aim at in conversation should be to show respect, esteem and good will, by paying everyone that common ceremony and regard which is in civility due to them."¹⁸⁸ This is "of use in civil life." This conception is worldly and pays no heed to the great commandment of the Great Teacher, "Love one another, as I have loved you." What a contrast there is between Locke and Faber in the matter of the lesser virtues. Father Faber, in his *Conferences on Kindness*, treats of kindness in words, thoughts, and acts, and develops the thought from a sympathetic, human viewpoint and bases his development on the true principles of Christian Charity, having the supernatural element in the foreground. Locke merely considers the man as man without a tincture of the super-

¹⁸⁶Sec. 141.

¹⁸⁷Sec. 143.

¹⁸⁸Sec. 144.

natural. Locke would have a polished gentleman and Faber, a Christian gentleman. Locke has in mind only the gentleman as he would shine in polite society; whereas Faber would have the Christian gentleman appear as he is in the sight of God. With Faber the Christian gentleman has an upright conscience and therefore his justice should be superior to that of the worldling, and in conformity with Christ, the great Model.

But there are other parts of Locke's theory of moral training to be considered, namely, those bearing on faults. Thus, childish levity, he says, cannot be deemed deserving of punishment. If the child does anything incorrectly or improperly, have him do it correctly and repeatedly. Too many rules are detrimental to the authoritative command. Their very multiplicity tends to confuse the child to the extent of obscuring the distinction between the important and unimportant.

Examples should lead them on to correct behavior, but a certain amount of freedom should be allowed. Care should be exercised in the selection of company for children, because of the facility with which they imitate what they see. For that very reason, we ourselves should not give them the example of loose morals. Locke is correct, for example is a powerful influence for good or evil, and hence both parents and teachers should carefully guard themselves in presence of children. What they see their elders doing they naturally conclude that they, too, have the privilege of imitating. Hence the warning of the Saviour about giving scandal to little ones.

Moreover, study should be made attractive to children by permitting them in the beginning to learn only such things to which they are inclined, or for which they are in the right humor; but they should soon be accustomed to control their inclinations, and to go at their

work, even when it has little or no attraction for them. However, parents and teachers should not allow children to follow their humors, even from the beginning, because to do so would render the acquisition of control difficult later; repression or restraint by the teacher might then be regarded by the child as an infringement upon his liberty.

Impassioned reproofs are bad. Only stubbornness and perverseness should be treated with rigor. But once the temper of the child is broken, kindness should prevail. Children should be given a reasonable talking to as soon as they are capable of profiting thereby. It is well to direct them to observe the way other people act, in order that they may draw profit therefrom. If anything blameworthy is noticed in them, they may be led to see their faults by observing the estrangement of those around them; here the sense of shame should influence them. The father should exercise great care in selecting a tutor for his son. The tutor should have a broad and deep knowledge of human nature, for it is his duty to acquaint his pupil with the errors and vices of the world that he may guard himself against them. Locke is in harmony with our best principles on this point. We feel prompted only to add to his tutor's qualifications, that acquaintance with psychology and child nature, so necessary for the right understanding, and treatment of the young. While Locke did not possess a sufficient knowledge of psychology, he had sound common sense and keen observation, as his counsels show. For instance, his teacher must study the character or rather the temperament of the pupils, in order to govern and guide them rightly. He should never forget that no two pupils are exactly alike in temperament, and hence he cannot hope to treat them alike.

Locke rightly says that a spirit of dominion should be opposed, and the desire to know encouraged. The

latter is accomplished by taking the pupil away from a useful occupation, while he still takes delight in it, in order that he may later return to it with pleasure, as if to recreation. Thus, we introduce variety into his occupations, and the one is used as a rest from the other. This thought recurs repeatedly in the book. Its application, too, is seen in the advice not to permit children to continue a useful occupation in which they take great satisfaction until they become disgusted with it and long to return again to something else. In taking such measures, the educator's aim is to associate what is good and desirable with impressions of pleasure, as well as to associate what is to be avoided as bad, with the thought of pain. Sensitive children must be hardened. Curiosity must be gratified in so far as that can serve to enlighten their understanding. The child's mind is extremely active and longs to be at something new. The successful teacher closely studies the bent of the child's mind and hence provides for that activity by assigning different tasks. Nervous children easily become restless and seek for change and variety. The teacher will provide such opportunities as they need. As the child is naturally curious, the teacher will strive to direct such curiosity into the proper channels. Once that is accomplished, teaching becomes a pleasure and the pupils make progress. It stands to reason that certain morbid curiosities should be repressed and can never be encouraged. Forbidden pleasures are generally sought after, and hence it is that the prudent teacher should be on his guard at all times. One careless slip may entail serious consequences and perhaps bring moral shipwreck to the child.

SUMMARY

Locke's aim in moral training is to develop character, and while he, in general terms, speaks of the knowledge of God, the practice of daily prayers, he is, nevertheless,

very vague. Religion is apparently the least essential, while all that tends to make a gentleman is primary.

There is no doubt about Locke's high estimate of moral worth, for he insists that the child should acquire virtue and shun vice. From a utilitarian standard he shows the great benefit of virtue, of manly conduct, and correct principles of living. He urges the tutor to be exemplary and to avoid whatever may leave a false impression upon the child. He teaches, moreover, that a virtuous life is to be preferred to all else, and that the qualities that make the gentleman should be carefully cultivated. With all this, however, Locke's ideal is not of that ennobling quality which a Christian philosopher would have demanded. Christ, the great Exemplar, is never once mentioned, much less presented as a model. When Locke appeals to the conscience of the child, it is reason only that speaks, the voice of his Maker is not heard. When he extolls conduct as a means to win esteem and commendation, the Divine Will is left out of view. Such a moral system is in danger of becoming thoroughly utilitarian and rationalistic, if not materialistic.

(To be continued)

REVIEWS AND NOTICES

Common Sense in School Supervision, by Charles A. Wagner,
Superintendent of Schools, Chester, Pa. Milwaukee, Wis.:
Bruce Publishing Co.

In the words of the author himself, this work consists of chapters on supervision which have grown out of classroom experience and out of supervisory experience of all kinds; thirty years of practising, of speaking, and of writing the ideas presented offer the warrant for publishing them. Various aspects of supervision are treated in the book, but chiefly those affecting the supervision of instruction. There are some interesting discussions on the merits of different methods of supervision, the author's experience usually dictating the trend of the discussion and "common sense" the conclusion. It is to be expected that from so long an experience many helpful ideas and suggestions may be learned, for our supervisory science is, after all, largely empirical. Some of the best suggestions which this book offers are in the line of teacher improvement through constructive criticism of her work by supervisors and through a general cooperative spirit on the part of supervisor and supervised. For a book written by a superintendent, the teacher's side of the discussion has been kept well into the foreground. The book may consequently be found helpful to supervisor and teacher, although as to the manner of inspection and other details of the supervisor's work many of the recommendations of the author are open to serious discussion, our most recent practice rather tending toward their rejection.

PATRICK J. MCCORMICK.

Beginning Latin, by Perley Oakland Place, Litt.D. New York:
American Book Company. Pp. 398.

During these days of experimentation in Latin-teaching methods, Place's "Beginning Latin" appears as the champion of the learn-Latin-through-English theory. Related English words, with the Latin element typographically emphasized, are placed in the vocabularies, beside the Latin. English

grammar is made introductory to each point of Latin syntax. Various other features to increase the interest and pleasure of the first-year Latin are also added, such as numerous illustrations, English and equivalent Latin quotations, appropriate selections for reading, etc.

The aim of this book is indeed worthy, emphasizing, as it does, a feature of Latin teaching which is usually not sufficiently stressed—Latin relation to English. Yet it is a question whether the material for first-year Latin has not been piled up so that it has extended beyond the compass of a single year's high-school work.

It should, indeed, be a consolation to Latin teachers that the proposed investigation of Latin and Greek teaching in secondary schools promises to offer suggestions which can be adopted with some degree of confidence. In the meantime, the careful teacher will be chary of departing, to any great extent, from the old conservative and thorough methods of our forefathers.

ROY J. DEFERRARI.

Caesar's Gallic War, Books VI and VII, Partly in the Original and Partly in Translation, by R. W. Livingstone and C. E. Freeman. **Sallust, the Jugurthine War, Partly in the Original and Partly in Translation**, by H. E. Butler. New York. Oxford University Press, American Branch. \$1.00.

The two books at hand form part of a new series of the Latin and Greek authors—the Clarendon Series. All teachers surely have felt that through the short passages of the daily lessons a student does not get very far in a term's work. Further, in his struggle with the language, he is liable to miss the general sense of what he is reading. He misses the human element of the classic, and is apt to be filled with a lasting distaste for the subject.

To meet these difficulties the Clarendon Series presents texts, two pages of which are translated in English for every one page that is left in Latin. The notes on the English part call attention to matters of historical and literary interest, while those on the Latin text give full attention to linguistic and grammatical points. Vocabularies accompany each vol-

ume. By such texts, the editors believe that the student's interest will be aroused and more attention will be given to the subject matter of the Classics, while, at the same time, nothing will be lost in the careful and detailed study of the usual amount of the Latin original.

The system seems very practicable, and one which we would like to see tried out. But at present, with the fixed requirements of our various educational boards, such text-books could scarcely be used in regular classes. However, for special classes, outside of the realm of college requirements, or even for sight reading, the books at hand might be found very satisfactory.

ROY J. DEFERRARI.

The Philosophical Writings of Richard Burthogge, edited, with Introduction and Notes, by Margaret W. Landes, Hallowell Fellow at Wellesley College, 1913-1914. Chicago, London: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1921.

This volume presents the chief philosophical treatises of an English philosopher of the seventeenth century, who had fallen into almost complete oblivion. The contents are: *Organum Vetus et Novum*—a Discourse of Reason and Truth—an Essay upon Reason—of the Soul of the World. The editor furnishes an introduction, an outline of the philosophy, copious notes, and a bibliography.

From more than one point of view these essays are worth reproduction. A contemporary of Locke, Burthogge's plain, homely, common sense, method of simplifying, as far as possible, in thought and language, the problems which he treats, resembles that of his more famous countryman. Here and there the reader comes upon a touch of dry humor, the like of which never gleams over any page of the *Essay on the Human Understanding*.

The preface states that "It is hardly to be hoped that the reader of this book will 'make sense' of all that Burthogge says. The attentive reader can not, however, fail to profit both by his keen and sympathetic comment on his immediate predecessors and contemporaries and by his first-hand introspection, sound

argument, and independent thinking." Anyone familiar with scholastic philosophy will have no difficulty in making sense, and sound sense, too, out of Burthogge's analysis of the cognitive faculties, and his theory of reason; for his theory in the main, is identical with scholastic theory; though he has not at his disposal the scholastic precision of terminology. We may join in the tribute to his independence of thought, on the ground that he seems to have reached his conclusions without suspecting that the path which he had struck upon was not a new one, but an ancient Roman road which had completely disappeared from the ken of his contemporaries. He resolutely insists on the objective value of both sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge. "Every faculty has a hand, though not the sole hand, in making its immediate object; as the eye makes the colors it is said to see, the ear the sounds, the fancy the idols, and so the understanding the conceptions or notions under which it apprehends and sees things. So that all the immediate objects of humane cogitation (to use the word in its largest sense) are *entia cogitationis*, all appearances, which are not *properly*, and (may I use a school term), *formally* in the things themselves conceived under them, and consequently conceived as if they had them, but so only in cogitative faculties" (p. 12). This is the scholastic doctrine that sound, color, time, space, etc., exist *formaliter in mente*, *fundamentaliter in re*. Elsewhere we read—"Notions of the mind are *bottomed* on *sentiments* of sense; so that as realities are grounds to sentiments, so *sentiments* are grounds to notions; the impressions of things without upon the sensories, produce on occasion in them the cogitations which we call sentiments, as colors, sounds, vapours, etc. And sentiments (again) impressing of the fancy, and so the mind and understanding, beget on occasion in it those higher cogitations which we call notions; apprehensions of reason, or ideas. Idols or fancies are in the fancy, ideas in the mind" (p. 18). This is an excellent epitome in plain, original English, of the scholastic account of the relation between sense and intellect, the formation by the intellect of its ideas, by abstracting from the *data* furnished by the senses external and internal—*nihil in intellectu nisi quod fuerit in sensu*.

The editor reads into these and similar statements of her author a similarity with the theory of Kant. "Both" she says, "teach that the object of knowledge is phenomenal, not real" (p. 17); and "Burthogge's teaching about the nature of the thing is essentially the same as that of Kant" (p. 19). Burthogge's meaning for the term *Phaenomena* does not coincide with that of Kant's *phenomenon*. He teaches, as we have seen, that *formaliter*, the quality, as sound, for example, exists in the mind; but, contrary to Kant, he teaches that this formal representation is based upon, drawn from, and leads to a perception of the real object. "The immediate objects of cogitation are external in their *grounds*, as well as in appearance; and in truth are, therefore, external in appearance, because they are so *really* in their grounds. . . . The immediate objects of all other cogitations, as well as of vision are ordinarily and naturally as external in their grounds as they are in appearance; that is, are fundamentally external as well as apparently" (pp. 87-88). Again Burthogge writes: "But here it must be remembered that (as I have shewed before) though we do not see the *reality* of things immediately, and just as in the things themselves, yet by means of sentiments and notions, we do, somehow, perceive it" (p. 83). The *real* world, the noumenal world, Kant holds, is beyond the reach of the intellect—the only *reality* we know is the noumenal ego manifesting itself in the categorical imperative.

If we turn to Burthogge's account of our assent to necessary truths, or first principles, we find him again the champion of objectivity. "Besides, these very principles, themselves, which we call first ones, or anticipations shining by their own luster and light, propositions which we can not but assent to as soon as we hear them or mind them, it will appear, if we reflect warily on what doth pass in our minds, that even these are not assented to but on the evidence they bring; I mean not assented to naturally, but (as other propositions are) judicially." And he continues to explain, in harmony with scholastic teaching, that the assent of the mind to first principles, or necessary truths, is compelled by the objective evidence, not through any *a priori* subjective transcendental necessity, as in the Kantian system, which denies that the speculative

intellect affords any grounds for holding that first principles have any objective validity at all. When the author touches upon our knowledge of God, he follows the scholastic line of reasoning. Starting from the data of the senses, we reason to the principle of casuality, to the existence of mind as substantially distinct from matter; to the existence of a first cause, which is pure mind. What knowledge can we reach of the divine nature? To this question Burthogge's answer is like a page of a scholastic text-book, setting forth the lesson that, while we reason to the nature and attributes of God, we reason from what we know of creatures. Nevertheless, we can predicate nothing of God and the creature unequivocally, but only analogically—"whoever well attends will find that all the notions under which we apprehend God are notions of Him, like those we have of the world, not as He is in Himself (for so we know Him not); but as He stands in our analogy, and in that of the world; which notions are very fitly stiled attributes" (p. 24). Again, he states that when the scriptures represent God under terms and titles which, in their literal sense, are applicable only to human beings "this is parabolical, and, but comparative knowledge; however, we ought to satisfy and content ourselves therewith, for thought is not to know the deity in the reality, as He is in Himself, yet it suffices for the principal *End* for which we should endeavor to know Him, which is to adore and obey Him" (p. 110). Kant's account of our intellectual idea of God is that it is a transcendental element in the intellect's clock work, serving to unify knowledge. Had Richard been vouchsafed, out of due time, a copy of the critique of pure reason, with its categories, ideas, necessary judgments, etc., all *a priori*, independent of experience, one can easily imagine him repeating his reflection that "beings are not to be multiplied without necessity, and there is *none* of feigning such anticipations and habits of principles to direct the mind in inquisitions after truth, since all acknowledge there are no such principles in the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, to direct *them*, and why, then, in the minde?" In his philosophy of knowledge he is a follower, however unconscious, of Thomas Aquinas, rather than the precursor of Emmanuel Kant.

Another essay in this volume, couched as a *Letter to Mr. Lock*, treats of the *soul of the world*. It is a reply to some criticisms made by a Mr. Keil on Burthogge's essay on reason. Mr. Keil's attentions seem not to have been complimentary. "He hath," writes Richard, "done me the honor (though I am not sure he designed it for one) to mention me with several very celebrated persons; but he doth it in that manner, and with that abatement that I have no great cause of being exalted in that regard." The doctrine which Mr. Keil did not approve of—and we find no fault with him therefor—is, that there is a universal soul of the world, which acts through all organized beings, including man. This conception is no wise pantheistic; Burthogge arraigns Spinoza's pantheism severely in the essay. This universal soul is "that mosaical spirit (called, Gen. I, v. 2, the Spirit of God) being the spirit of life, and present everywhere in all parts of the universe, is the original of all the energy, motion, and action therein, especially of that which is animal." The author, in support of his opinion, cites the sacred scriptures, Greek, Roman, Christian, ancient and modern philosophers, in great abundance. He admits that against his hypothesis it may be objected that "it does seem to render the distinction between human and inferior souls less conceivable, and in consequence the immortality of the former." "But," he replies, "this objection will soon vanish if we but suppose there is a firm and indissoluble union between the spirit of God and its vehicle in *Man*, and there is not the like union between it and its vehicle in *inferior animals*" (p. 174).

The bibliography contains a long list of other works of Burthogge on philosophical, religious, and medical subjects. The editor has executed her task with scholarly patience, and is to be congratulated on having retrieved a book that deserves to live on.

JAMES J. FOX.